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land and water in ways that some who
focus on the religious conflicts, the
shadow of the past, and the various
weaknesses of the Israeli-Palestinian
and other Arab authority structures forget. In short, academics, policy makers,
and military officers should pay close
attention to those regions that have the
greatest potential for armed conflict
based on the relative scarce supplies of
critical resources.
PETER DOMBROWSKI

Naval War College

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of
Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.
490pp. $25.95

Were you to begin with the last chapter
of this book, “A World of Terror,” you
would note that radical Islamists do not
have an exclusive hold on terror as a
strategic weapon. In fact, you might be
well advised to consider reading this
chapter first, to understand that extremist adherents of Christianity as well
as other faiths also have employed sacred terror as a tool in the pursuit of
their aims. If, on the other hand, you
choose to begin with chapter 1, you will
receive a good overview of the terrorist
events of the past ten to twelve years,
with a focus on those of Islamic origin.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
senior staff members of the Clinton
administration’s National Security
Council, paint a coherent picture of the
genesis of sacred terror, the response to
it, and prospects for the future. The
time frame also includes the end and
the beginning of the two Bush administrations. Benjamin and Simon’s conclusion points out the long-term nature of
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the issue and recommends that the
West engage it with a view to the
postconflict possibilities. The book’s
purpose may include an attempt to influence history’s interpretation of the
data, particularly with regard to the
years of the authors’ involvement, but
that hardly negates its significance.
Benjamin and Simon offer three particularly valuable discussions. First, they
carefully tease three threads from the
history of radical Islamism. Second,
they give an airing to the workings of
government—probably always less than
transparent. In this, they do not hesitate
to parcel out responsibility for good
and for ill. Finally, they offer a strategic
reflection that goes beyond radical
Islamism.
That Islam was, and can be, a religion
of the sword should come as no surprise. After Muhammad (d. 632), Taqi
al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1269, an
accomplished Islamic jurist at age
twenty, established the intellectual underpinning of today’s radical Islamism.
Ibn Taymiyya did more than anyone to
erect jihad—actual warfare—as a pillar
of Islam. From him descended in the
subsequent centuries serious intellectuals, hard men ready to commit violence, messianic figures whose zeal
seems most foreign to twenty-firstcentury realities. Together, “they feed
into the eruption of jihadist Islamism
that has confronted the West, America
in particular, over the last decade.”
Now, the warrior prince Usama bin
Laden carries jihadism into the new
millennium.
“Exactly when the name Usama bin
Laden began appearing in American intelligence reports and FBI investigative
materials is something we are unlikely
to ever learn.” This observation,
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coupled with the truism that we judge
the unknown to be unlikely, points out
how it was that we only gradually gave
shape and definition to the terrorist
threat. When one considers that the
United States was riding the laurels of
the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War and that
its economy was steaming comfortably,
it seems almost understandable that no
one put all the pieces together earlier.
Nevertheless, Benjamin and Simon take
turns putting agencies and leaders in
the pillory. Interagency collaboration is
mostly a game of “I’ve got a secret.” Alley politics overshadow intelligent analysis and policy making as the White
House and Capitol Hill threw punches
at each other; a president lacked personal credibility; and the news media,
aware of the public’s low interest for international news, failed to pursue stories aggressively.
Before 9/11, “America was the prisoner
of an old paradigm for thinking about
terrorism, and it could be released only
through a revolutionary act of violence.” Herein lies a tragic blessing. As
its long-range response, the administration created a new cabinet-level department for homeland security. Other
measures were also taken, and others
need to be taken once the technology
measures up. Additionally, citizens and
governments alike must become much
more attuned to the various currents
that have been shaped by the past and
that will shape the future. Developing a
sustainable strategy depends on it, lest
the tragedy become pathos.
The book concludes with a riveting
chapter on terrorism under the cloak of
other religions. Jewish messianism, the
quasi-Buddhist cult Aum Shinrikyo,
and Christian apocalyptic literature and
movements all point to more terrorism.
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The Age of Sacred Terror will enlighten
leaders and citizens alike, and it should
be a must-read for midlevel officers, especially those aspiring to senior leadership. It challenges the way we plan and
train, and it certainly provides grist for
the mill of doctrine development—
while pointing out, yet again, that this
is not the foe our parents and grandparents faced. If we learn no other lesson,
this book will have served us well.
S. DOUGLAS SMITH

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Kurspahic, Kemal. Prime Time Crime: Balkan
Media in War and Peace. Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
261pp. $19.95

Solving the puzzle of the destruction of
Yugoslavia is one of the dominant historical and political questions of our
time. Prominent scholars, high-ranking
military officers, and noted politicians
all seem to be asking how an advanced
confederation could fail so quickly and
with such disastrous consequences.
Kemel Kurspahic, the award-winning
editor of the Sarajevo wartime daily
newspaper Oslobodjenje, provides some
important answers to this question with
his firsthand account of media in the
former Yugoslavia.
This book provides chilling, first-person
insight into the decline of the Yugoslavian media into nationalism and into
its contribution to the destruction of
the Yugoslav federation. Kurspahic, a
Bosnian Muslim, paints a picture of the
disintegration of the former republic
that, like many horror stories, is at once
riveting, revolting, and compelling.
This is a work that is riveting in its
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